

THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

News from the Front!

AUG 94

IN THIS ISSUE!

The Leader Training Program (LTP)
My Observations
NORTHERN LIGHTS 94
Civilian Contract Aircraft and Airmobile Operations
The Logistics Anchor Desk

THE LEADER TRAINING PROGRAM (LTP)

by CPT Phil Kaiser, Cbt Maneuer Analyst

The National Training Center (NTC) will be offering rotational units a new training opportunity beginning October 1994. It is the Leader Training Program (LTP). The LTP provides commanders and their staffs an enhanced training opportunity in preparation for their upcoming rotation. The program is designed around core training objectives and a menu of elective subject areas selected by the commander based on his own training assessment.

The LTP is conducted four months prior to a unit's scheduled NTC rotation. The program gives Active Component units a six-day training opportunity, and National Guard units a three-day training opportunity. The unit rotating through the LTP blllets at the NTC where lodging, meals, and transportation are provided. This prevents travel to and from Barstow, CA, on a daily basis.

The LTP begins with the brigade commander providing a current METL and staff assessment 60 days prior to the start of the program. NTC then develops a proposed schedule for the week of training. The training schedule is returned to the unit and the commander approves or adjusts the training as necessary. The commander approves the schedule 30 days prior to the LTP.

The core training objectives include:

- ► Tactical Decisionmaking Process
- ► Battle Synchronization
- ► An NTC battle and AAR
- ► A JANUS exercise followed by an AAR
- Onward Movement/Logistics Reconnaissance
- ► Battle Command
- ► IPB

The elective program offers a wide variety of subjects taught by subject matter experts (OCs). Electives that unit commanders can choose from include:

- ► Heavy/Light Integration
- ► MOUT
- ► Indirect Fire Planning
- ► Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance
- Engagement Area Development
- Direct Fire Planning
- ► Air Assault Operations
- ► Attack Helicopter Employment
- Breach Operations
- ► NTC Lessons Learned (current trends)
- ► Observations on Staff Planning

Questions or comments on the LTP can be directed to LTC Schoenbeck, Chief, LTP, or MAJ Brayn at DSN 470-3913.

MY OBSERVATIONS

COL Roger Spickelmier, Dir, CALL

Today we are both a CONUS-based and a forward presence U. S. Army. Regardless of our location, all units and soldiers must be prepared to participate in force projection. This is seen today in the deployments and operations away from home station conducted by FORSCOM units, UNOSOM, I Corps, and USAREUR. It is also apparent in the preparations of our Reserve and National Guard units.

If you are preparing for deployment, overseas or to one of the Combat Training Centers, we believe we can help. By using lessons from those who have proceeded us, we avoid repetition of mistakes.

Do not hesitate to call. Make CALL work for you. When you deploy, CALL wants to be with you prior to your deployment and during your operation through our lessons and information.

COL Roger Spickelmier, Dir, CALL

Editor's Note:

COL Spickelmier recently departed CALL to attend a senior war college. Farewell and best wishes!

NORTHERN LIGHTS 94

Initial Insights and Lessons by CPT Mark F. Williams, CSS Analyst

Exercise NORTHERN LIGHTS 94 was a combined American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted at the Royal Canadian Military College (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, 4-18 June 1994. The exercise was selected as a U. S. Army Louisiana Maneuver (LAM) for this year, and LAM conducted observation collection in three FY 94 issue areas (Space, C4I, and Sustainment), along with integrating and demonstrating new technologies as a part of the exercise. Over 30 LAM and issue proponent personnel took part in NORTHERN LIGHTS 94.

In general, the exercise showed the value of space capabilities in enhancing combined operations. Specific insights on space-based new technologies included:

Topographic Support:

Topographic information continues to be the backbone of army and combined warfare. The Multi-Spectral Imagery (MSI) processor and the other space and topographic equipment, such as the Battlefield Visualization System (BVS), provided excellent support to the participants. The exercise highlighted the need to be able to transmit this critical information electronically from the topographic support team to all users. Doctrine and resources need to be examined, both for equipment and personnel. The need for a Rapid Response Topographic Terrain Team (R2T2), equipped with new technologies, is evident.

Advanced Technology Communications Satellite (ACTS):

The use of ACTS capability (a T-1 data rate at 1.544 MBPS with a four-foot diameter antenna) very successfully demonstrated the split-based operations concept. ACTS was used to connect the forward topographic team at Kingston with the Topographic Engineer Center (TEC) at Ft Belvoir, VA. A combination of voice, video, imagery, and data was transmitted back and forth. The forward team was supported electronically with the capabilities at TEC. This also highlighted the limited SATCOM capability available to U. S. Army forces with ACTS being an experimental NASA satellite covering only the western hemisphere.

Weather:

The Small Weather Receiver provided excellent weather support to the exercise. Weather products were used and valued. All participants appreciate the importance of weather and having good weather information. Weather is still not being fully integrated into exercises in terms of its impact on operations. As with topographic support, the exercise highlighted the importance of developing a transmission capability to provide critical information from the weather team down to forward users in near real time.

Space-Enhanced Command and Control System (SPECC):

The use of the U. S. SPECC and the Canadian C2 system (Interim Operational Capability, IntOC) showed the importance, and limitations, of automated C2 systems for future allied and coalition warfare. Automated systems with SPECC capabilities can greatly enhance coordination and operations. Under the ABCA lead-nation concept, the lead-nation is responsible for providing enough C2 systems to effectively execute battle command among the ABCA Headquarters one echelon down, as the Canadians did at NORTHERN LIGHTS. The exercise also showed the problems between echelons when one has automated equipment and another does not. A need exists to have higher (and lateral) echelons also tied to the C2 system.

Sustainment Insights/Lessons:

While CSS (i.e., sustainment) functions were not a primary goal of the exercise, sustainment operations and functions would have improved with the inclusion of the Combined Logistic Support Command (CLSC) as a player headquarters. Including the CLSC would have forced all participants to play logistics and not "wish" them away. The CLSC is an ABCA concept headquarters made up of CSS units from all nations under the command and control of a lead nation. The force structure is based on a U. S. Army Corps Support Command (COSCOM), and the CLSC is designed to provide third-line support to all ABCA nations involved. The Materiel Management Center (MMC) functions at the division would have greatly increased the asset visibility and CSS planning capability at the division. These functions may need to be studied within the ABCA lead-nation concept when planning division operations.

Overall Review of C4I Insights and Lessons:

The lead-nation concept was the cornerstone for observations on the ABCA Communications and Information Systems (CIS-Battle Command System). Through execution of this concept, interoperability issues are reduced when the lead nation provides CISs down one command echelon.

Interconnecting participating nation's CIS is critical to finding interoperability issues. The use of a "single architecture within the U. S." could improve the framework the ABCA nations use when developing their CIS. Standardization of formats, policy, and procedures through program Quardipartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) is also key to interoperability. A modification of security policy will be required to ensure that classified data can be managed to permit release to ABCA (combined) forces.

Split-based operations were proven in concept by use of ACTS in support of the topographic support team. Large data sets can be created within the sustainment or sanctuary base and electronically passed forward. The communications capability inherent with split basing also provides the means to consult with SMEs and technicians in the rear to correct system and software problems at forward locations.

Exercise NORTHERN LIGHTS 94 proved to be a successful ABCA exercise and highlighted the importance of combined exercises to validate program agreements and SOPs. The LAM-TF collection effort gained valuable insights for the issue proponents as part of the LAM process.

CIVILIAN CONTRACT AIRCRAFT AND AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

by CPT John Hort, Cbt Mnvr Analyst

Conducting U. S. Airmobile Operations within the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM) peacekeeping AO posed several limitations when operating with civilian contract pilots.

Prior to Apr 94, UN FYROM used four civilian contract helicopters for transport of cargo and troops. The two Bell 212s (similar to a UH1HN) and the two Bell 206s (extended model of an OH58) were operated by civilian pilots.

- U. S. helicopter support operations consisted primarily of shuttling personnel and equipment from the border observation posts (OPs) to Camp Able Sentry (approximately 60 miles). Due to the poor trafficability of the road network in and around the Ops, helicopter support became an intrical part of Able Sentry's transport plan. However, with the increased need for helicopter missions, U. S. commanders faced restrictions while operating under contracted civilian aircraft and pilots. Contract stipulations and insurance restrictions prevented the TF from conducting several standard military airmobile operations.
- ! The pilots were not NVG-qualified. This alone posed a great limitation particularly when requesting an immediate night Air MEDEVAC from the border Ops. Reinforcement of the OPs at night by air was also severely limited due to this restriction. The only means of deploying the reinforcement platoon to remote locations in FYROM at night was either by truck, HMMWV, or track.
- ! The contract pilots resided in Skopje, Macedonia, 20 minutes from the airfield and Able Sentry. This presented problems when attempting to request immediate nonscheduled helicopter support within FYROM.
- ! The helicopters were not fitted with crew-served mounts for the M60 machine gun. Contract restrictions prevented the task force from mounting machineguns on the helicopters.
- ! Seating configurations on the 212s made it extremely difficult for squad-sized units to load and dismount aircraft quickly under standard military airmobile conditions. This made most movements by air administrative and not conducive to quick entries and exits of the aircraft. Squad leaders were forced to take several minutes loading and unloading soldiers and equipment from aircraft during takeoff and landing. During one of the simulated UN reinforcement exercises (hostile crowds surrounding a UN compound), the U. S. platoon's advance party was forced to load and unload the aircraft under slow, arduous administrative conditions.
- ! UN and contract restrictions prevented pilots from flying nap of the earth (NOE). While U.S. leaders realized this was conducive to operating under the UN neutrality rules, concerns on flying U.S. soldiers still persisted particularly during increased levels of the THREATCON.

Recently (Apr 94), U.S. Army, Europe, in response to U.S. concerns over force protection within FYROM, deployed three U.S. UH60 helicopters with soldiers and a support package to FYROM. With this added use of military rotary-wing support, the task force has been able to minimize some of the problems

THE LOGISTICS ANCHOR DESK (LAD)

by CPT Mark F. Williams, CSS Analyst

The LAD is a U. S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) automation initiative designed to link logistic data sources, models, and simulations to provide more effective logistics management. LAD was developed as part of AMC's participation in the CSA's Louisiana Maneuvers process. A prototype LAD system was integrated into, and used by, Corps, EAC, and DA logisticians during exercise Prairie Warrior/GHQx 94.

The LAD was developed to answer two recurring problems in logistics management and automation systems. These problems are: logistics systems developed by functional proponents normally have a "stovepipe" view of logistics data, and management models and simulations are often built as single tools with limited connectivity to data sources or other automation tools. LAD was developed to unify data sources, models, and simulations to permit more effective logistics management.

A prototype LAD was used during Prairie Warrior/GHQx 94 to explore the LAM sustainment issue. Users included Corps and Theater players at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 310th TAACOM players at Ft Lee, VA, and U. S. Army DCSLOG players.

The LAD has the capability to show a virtual logistics battlefield. In a "real-world" deployment, the software is linked into the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) database, Government Transportation Network (GTN) data, and Standard Army Materiel Information System (STAMIS) data to provide near real-time logistics information for items in place, in transit, and in theater. The comprehensive information the LAD provides can then be fed into models and simulations to support the development and evaluation of courses of action and plans. LAD gives logistics a capability to see "what is" and plan "what ifs." It allows leaders to see the same logistics battlefield, share information, and make joint decisions. The LAD can also be linked to logistics training simulation databases to provide the same real-time virtual logistics information during training exercises.

During Prairie Warrior/GHQx 94, the LAD was linked into the combat, combat service support, deployment, and asset visibility simulation databases for use by all players. This linkage of databases provided the "what is" capability while the LAD's AMP and KBLPS models provided the "what ifs." Using the LAD during Prairie Warrior/GHQx 94 allowed AMC observers to gain some initial insights into:

- ! How much TAV data is necessary to perform C2 and planning functions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war?
- ! How and what TAV data is needed, and how can this data be turned into usable information?
- ! What additional "what is" and "what if" capability is needed for the LAD?
- ! Where should the LAD capability be located within a theater?

Prairie Warrior/GHQx 94 provided valuable insights into the LAD and its capability. LAD was used by players to see both U. S. Army and theater stockage levels, assist in the development of COAs for theater missions, and track the arrival of theater sustainment stock and the download of data files for use in unit PCs which changed LAD data into unit usable information. The exercise demonstrated the need for a system with the capability of the LAD. Expect to see the LAD integrated into more exercises as the system continues its development process. For more information on LAD, contact the HQ AMC LAM Office at DSN 284-8710.

CALL EDITORIAL STAFF!

MANAGING EDITOR - Dr. Lon R. Seglie

EDITOR PLUS LAYOUT AND DESIGN -Mary Sue Winneke

> DISTRIBUTION -SFC Terrance L. Durben SFC William R. Bray

DISCLAIMER

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.